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CRIMINAL LAW—SENTENCING JUVENILES—WHERE DO WE GO FROM 
HERE? MANDATORY SENTENCING AND RETROACTIVE APPLICATION POST-
MILLER. MILLER V. ALABAMA, 132 S. CT. 2455 (2012). 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
“There can be no keener revelation of a society’s soul than the way in 
which it treats its children.”1 It is even more telling when looking at the way 
society punishes its children. The stories of Kuntrell and Evan described 
below demonstrate the importance of allowing a court to consider mitigating 
circumstances when sentencing the nation’s youth. 
Kuntrell,2 age fourteen, and his older friends were out one night when 
they decided to rob a video store. On their way, Kuntrell learned that one of 
his friends, Derek, was carrying a sawed-off shotgun. Kuntrell initially 
stayed outside of the store, but later, after seeing Derek point the gun at the 
store clerk, went inside and said, “I thought you all was playin’.” After the 
clerk threatened to call the police, Derek shot the clerk, killing her. 
Evan, age fourteen, and a friend went to the home of his mother’s drug 
dealer, Cole, to smoke marijuana and play drinking games. After Cole 
passed out, Evan attempted to steal his money. Cole awoke and grabbed 
Evan. Evan, who had reached for a bat, started to strike Cole repeatedly. 
After several blows, Evan put a sheet over Cole’s head and said “I am God; 
I’ve come to take your life,” and struck him again. Evan and his friend left 
but later returned to set Cole’s home on fire to cover up the crime. 
In both cases, the lower courts were unable to consider any mitigating 
factor, such as age, which resulted in both of these boys receiving the exact 
same sentence as anyone else who committed these offenses: mandatory life 
without parole.3 The Supreme Court of the United States struck down the 
mandatory portion of both boys’ sentences in Miller v. Alabama4 and re-
quired that mitigating factors be taken into account in these cases. The Court 
found that the lack of discretion in sentencing violated the Eighth Amend-
 
 1. Nelson Mandela, President of South Africa, Speech at the launch of the Nelson 
Mandela Children’s Fund (May 8, 1995) (transcript available at http://db.nelsonmandela.org/
speeches/pub_view.asp?pg=item&ItemID=NMS250&txtstr=Mahlamba). 
 2. The following factual scenarios are taken from the real crimes committed by 
Kuntrell Jackson and Evan Miller, defendants in the consolidated Supreme Court case, Miller 
v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). For more detail about their initial prosecutions, see 
Jackson v. Norris, 2011 Ark. 49, 378 S.W.3d 103 (2011); Miller v. State, 63 So. 3d 676 (Ala. 
2010). 
 3. See generally Jackson v. Norris, 2011 Ark. 49, 378 S.W.3d 103; Miller v. State, 63 
So. 3d 676 (Ala. 2010). 
 4. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
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ment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.5 The Court explained 
that judges must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances 
when sentencing juvenile offenders facing life without parole.6 
This is not the first time the Supreme Court has distinguished between 
juveniles and adults in terms of appropriate sentencing practices.7 Although 
many people may believe that a juvenile offender who committed a serious 
crime deserves an equally harsh punishment as an adult,8 the Supreme Court 
has repeatedly based its juvenile jurisprudence on the notion that children by 
their very nature are inherently less culpable than adults, even when they 
commit heinous crimes.9 
In light of the “children are different” analysis relied upon by the Su-
preme Court in cases involving juvenile offenders,10 this note proposes that 
the Miller v. Alabama Supreme Court decision did not go far enough for two 
reasons. First, mandatory sentencing of juvenile offenders, as a whole, is 
unsupported by the Eighth Amendment.11 Second, the rule in Miller war-
rants retroactive application in order to prevent previous juvenile offenders 
from serving what are now unconstitutional sentences.12 
The next section, Part II, briefly explains the cases leading up to Miller 
and highlights the important factors that the Supreme Court of the United 
States considers when determining whether an adult sentence is appropriate 
for a child. Part III.A explains the negative impacts of mandatory sentences 
and argues that the analysis in Miller supports a complete ban on all manda-
tory sentences for juvenile offenders. Part III.B considers the jurisdictional 
split on whether Miller warrants retroactive application and argues for the 
importance of giving a retroactive effect to the ruling. Finally, the note con-
cludes in Part IV. 
 
 5. Id. at 2469. 
 6. Id. 
 7. For cases where the Supreme Court has made this distinction, see generally Graham 
v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Thompson v. Okla-
homa, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
 8. The author recognizes that any leniency on a criminal defendant can be controver-
sial; however, the Supreme Court of the United States has based its standard on scientific fact 
and common sense, which supports the conclusion that children who commit crimes are “less 
deserving of the most severe punishments.” Miller, 132 S. Ct at 2464 (quoting Graham, 506 
U.S. at 68). 
 9. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 82 (banning life without parole for juveniles convicted of 
non-homicide crimes); Roper, 543 U.S. at 568 (extending the ban on capital punishment for 
juveniles to the age of eighteen); Thompson, 487 U.S. at 823 (banning capital punishment for 
juveniles under the age of sixteen). 
 10. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464. 
 11. See id. at 2482 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting) (explaining that the majority opinion’s 
distinction between sentencing children and adults supports the proposition that mandatory 
sentences for juveniles could be barred altogether). 
 12. Hill v. Synder, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12160, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 30, 2013). 
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II.   BACKGROUND 
Juvenile offenders are capable of committing truly heinous crimes;13 
however, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the inherent nature of 
youth makes juveniles less culpable and more deserving of special consider-
ation.14 Miller v. Alabama is the most recent case in a series of cases restrict-
ing sentences that can be applied to juvenile offenders.15 In each case, the 
Court considered various factors to justify a different punishment for the 
same offense based on the age of the offender. This section focuses on the 
cases that came before Miller and the analysis the Supreme Court relies up-
on to explain why kids are inherently different. 
A. The Cases 
In 1988, the landscape of juvenile jurisprudence changed when the Su-
preme Court of the United States decided Thompson v. Oklahoma.16 In that 
decision, the Court eliminated capital punishment as a possible sentence for 
an individual who was under the age of sixteen at the time of the offense.17 
The defendant, William Wayne Thompson, who was fifteen at the time, 
brutally murdered Thompson’s brother-in-law with the help of three other 
individuals.18 Thompson was tried as an adult, convicted of first-degree 
murder, and sentenced to death.19 The Supreme Court overturned Thomp-
son’s sentence and held that executing a person who was under sixteen at 
the time of the offense was cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the 
Eighth Amendment.20 
Following Thompson, the Supreme Court again limited the possible 
sentences for juvenile criminal offenders in Roper v. Simmons21 by banning 
the death penalty for anyone under the age of eighteen.22 Simmons was sev-
enteen at the time he broke into his victim’s home and brutally murdered 
 
 13. For example, the defendant in Roper v. Simmons, who was seventeen at the time of 
his crime, kidnapped his victim out of her home, wrapped her face in duct tape and her hands 
in electrical wire before throwing her over a bridge to drown. 543 U.S. at 556–57. 
 14. Miller, 132 S. Ct at 2464 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 69 (2010)). 
 15. See Graham, 560 U.S at 82 (banning life without parole for juveniles convicted of 
non-homicide crimes); Roper, 543 U.S. at 568 (extending the ban on capital punishment for 
juveniles to the age of eighteen); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 823 (1988) (banning 
capital punishment for juveniles under the age of sixteen). 
 16. 487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
 17. Id. at 823. 
 18. Id. at 819. The victim, who suffered from multiple gunshot wounds, cuts on his 
torso, bruises, and a broken leg, was also abandoned in a river chained to concrete. Id. 
 19. Id. at 819–20. 
 20. Id. at 838. 
 21. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 22. Id. at 568. 
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her.23 The jury found him guilty of murder in the first degree and recom-
mended the death penalty.24 Simmons’s initial appeals were denied, but after 
Atkins v. Virginia,25 the Supreme Court of Missouri replaced Simmons’s 
death sentence with life without parole.26 The Supreme Court of the United 
States affirmed this decision and limited eligibility for the death penalty to 
those who were over the age of eighteen at the time of their offense.27 
The next major development came in 2010 with Graham v. Florida.28 
In Graham, the defendant violated his probation by participating in a home 
invasion with two older accomplices.29 As a result, the trial court sentenced 
Graham to life without parole for his earlier crime of armed burglary.30 Fo-
cusing on proportionality, however, the Supreme Court of the United States 
decided that the Eighth Amendment also prohibits sentencing a juvenile 
convicted of a non-homicide crime to life without parole.31 
Finally, in 2012, the Court decided Miller v. Alabama.32 This case 
reached the Supreme Court after it granted certiorari in two state supreme 
court decisions.33 In the cases below, defendants, Kuntrell Jackson and Evan 
Miller, each challenged his own mandatory sentence of life without parole.34 
Kuntrell Jackson was fourteen years old when he was involved in an at-
tempted robbery that resulted in the death of a video store clerk.35 Kuntrell 
was convicted of capital murder and aggravated robbery.36 Under Arkansas 
law at that time, the charge of felony murder was subject to a mandatory 
sentence of life without parole,37 meaning that, in the event of a conviction, 
the judge had no choice but to sentence the offender to life without parole. 
 
 23. Id. at 556–57. For a more detailed description of Simmons’s crime, see supra text 
accompanying note 13. 
 24. Roper, 543 U.S. at 558. 
 25. 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that execution of the mentally retarded was prohibited 
by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments). 
 26. Roper, 543 U.S. at 559–60. 
 27. Id. at 560, 568. 
 28. 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
 29. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 53–55 (2010). 
 30. Id. at 57. 
 31. Id. at 74. 
 32. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
 33. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2461–63 (2012). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 2461. 
 36. Id. The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed his convictions in Jackson v. State, 359 
Ark. 87, 194 S.W.3d 757. 
 37. ARK. CODE. ANN. § 5-10-101(c) (Repl. 1997). But now, post-Miller, subsection (c) 
has been severed as applied to juveniles, and capital murder is now considered a Class Y 
felony subject to a discretionary sentence of between ten and forty years or life. Jackson v. 
Norris, 2013 Ark. 175, at 7–8, 426 S.W.3d 906, 910; ARK. CODE. ANN. § 5-10-101(c)(1)(B) 
(Supp. 2013). 
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Evan Miller was also fourteen years old at the time of his crime.38 Evan 
was convicted of murder in the course of arson after he attempted to rob a 
man, beat him nearly to death, and then set his home on fire to destroy the 
evidence.39 Evan’s conviction was also subject to a mandatory sentence of 
life without parole.40 
Considering both of these cases, the Court decided that the “mandato-
ry” portion of the sentence was unconstitutional because the trial judge must 
grant juvenile offenders the opportunity to present evidence of mitigating 
circumstances before they are sentenced.41 In making this decision, the 
Court continued to rely on the “kids are different” analysis from the cases 
listed above and eliminated mandatory life without parole as an option for 
sentencing a juvenile offender.42 
The Court focused on the fact that the mandatory requirement prohibits 
the judge from considering the mitigating factors of youth such as age, 
background, and mental and emotional development.43 
Under these [mandatory] schemes, every juvenile will receive the same 
sentence as every other—the 17-year-old and the 14-year-old, the shoot-
er and the accomplice, the child from a stable household and the child 
from a chaotic and abusive one. And still worse, each juvenile (including 
these two 14-year-olds) will receive the same sentence as the vast major-
ity of adults committing similar homicide offenses—but really, as Gra-
ham noted, a greater sentence than those adults will serve.44 
Without discretionary authority, the offender who, like Kuntrell Jack-
son, is merely an accomplice to a felony murder will be subject to the same 
mandatory penalty as the offender who pulled the trigger.45 Equally telling, a 
child like Evan Miller, who was physically abused, suicidal, and neglected 
by his drug-addicted mother,46 will suffer the same punishment as an adult, 
who was instilled with a better sense of right and wrong simply due to age. 
In each of the above cases, the defendant committed a serious offense, yet 
 
 38. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2462. 
 39. Id. at 2462–63. 
 40. Id. at 2463 (citing ALA. CODE. ANN. §§ 13A-5-40(9), 13A-6-2(c) (1982)). 
 41. Id. at 2469. 
 42. Id. Note that a juvenile may still receive life without parole for a non-homicide 
crime, but the distinction that the Court makes here is that the sentence cannot be mandatory. 
Id. Instead, a sentencer must “take into account how children are different, and how those 
differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.” Id. 
 43. Id. at 2467. 
 44. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467–68 (emphasis in original). 
 45. See id. at 2468. 
 46. Id. at 2469. 
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the Supreme Court overturned each sentence on Eighth Amendment grounds 
based on important fundamental differences between children and adults.47 
B. General Differences Between Children and Adults 
As Justice Powell explained, “the experience of mankind, as well as the 
long history of our law, recogniz[es] that there are differences[,] which must 
be accommodated in determining the rights and duties of children as com-
pared with those of adults.”48 Distinctions based on age are prevalent in our 
current legal system. For example, in all fifty states individuals under the 
age of eighteen are not allowed to marry without parental consent, vote, or 
sit on a jury.49 Compared to adults, children lack experience, education, and 
generally some level of intelligence, which makes them more susceptible to 
peer pressure and less likely to consider the possible consequences of their 
actions.50 
In Roper v. Simmons and subsequent cases, the Supreme Court recog-
nized three fundamental differences between adults and children.51 First, it 
addressed how juveniles are generally less mature and responsible than their 
adult counterparts.52 Second, the Court acknowledged that juveniles are 
more susceptible to peer pressure.53 Third, the Court pointed out that a 
child’s character is not fully formed, and thus, can be reshaped over time.54 
These fundamental differences were the basis for the Court’s conclusion that 
“children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentenc-
ing.”55 
These same rules also justify a complete ban on mandatory sentencing 
as a whole and support an argument for applying Miller retroactively. The 
mitigating qualities of youth that distinguish children from adults, and upon 
which the court relies in making their decisions, are not newly developed.56 
 
 47. Id. at 2464. 
 48. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 823 (1988) (quoting Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 
565, 590–91 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting)). 
 49. See id. (discussing, specifically, the legal distinctions between children and adults in 
Oklahoma). 
 50. Id. at 835. “Particularly ‘during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, 
minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment’ expected of adults.” Eddings v. 
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115–16 (1982) (quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 
(1979)). 
 51. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005). 
 52. Id. at 569. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 570. 
 55. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012). 
 56. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (relying on science and sociological studies, and the 
experience of parents, to support the notion that juveniles lack the maturity and sense of 
responsibility of adults). 
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Children will often have some mitigating circumstance that courts may need 
to take into account when assigning a punishment, particularly in the context 
of accomplishing the penological goals discussed in the next section. 
C.  Penological Goals 
In addition to examining why children are fundamentally different 
from adults, the Court also considered whether a particular punishment of a 
juvenile will accomplish any of the four penological goals.57 The four goals 
are deterrence, rehabilitation, incapacitation, and retribution.58 The first three 
goals have utilitarian purposes, which reflect society’s hope to achieve a 
benefit from the punishment.59 In contrast, the fourth goal—retributivism—
is more concerned with payback.60 
Deterrence is intended to prevent crime by creating a fear of the pun-
ishment.61 Juveniles, however, are generally less likely than adults to con-
sider the future consequences of their actions.62 When compared with adults, 
juveniles are less likely to be deterred from a particular crime based on the 
punishment, and therefore, deterrence typically provides a less adequate 
justification for a particular punishment.63 As the Supreme Court explained, 
“[c]rimes committed by youths may be just as harmful to victims as those 
committed by older persons, but they deserve less punishment because ado-
lescents may have less capacity to control their conduct and to think in long-
range terms than adults.”64 
 
 57. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 71–74 (2010) (considering life without parole 
for juvenile non-homicide crimes against the goals of retribution, incapacitation, deterrence, 
and rehabilitation). 
 58. Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an Articu-
lated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1313 (2000). 
 59. Id. at 1316. 
 60. Id. at 1315–16. 
 61. Deterrence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 544 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 10th ed., 2014). 
There are two forms of deterrence: general and specific. Meghan J. Ryan, Judging Cruelty, 
44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 81, 108 (2010). General deterrence aims to reduce overall crime by 
targeting future offenders; specific deterrence aims to deter a particular offender from repeat-
ing the offense. Id. 
 62. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012) (explaining that juveniles, who are 
immature, reckless, and impetuous, are generally less likely to consider potential punish-
ments); accord Graham, 560 U.S. at 72 (explaining that juveniles are less likely to be de-
terred from a crime for the same reasons that make them less culpable than adults). 
 63. Graham, 560 U.S. at 72 (finding that deterrence did not justify the punishment at 
issue in the case); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571–72 (2005) (finding also that 
deterrence did not justify the punishment at issue in the case). 
 64. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 834 (1988) (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 
455 U.S. 104, 115 n.11 (1982)). 
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Like deterrence, incapacitation is a means of preventing offenders from 
returning to criminal activity.65 The Supreme Court recognized in Graham 
and Roper that “[i]t is difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate 
between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient 
immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable 
corruption.”66 
On the other hand, rehabilitation, the third goal of punishment, is in-
tended to help the criminal become a productive member of society.67 “[I]t 
would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, 
for a greater possibility exists that a minor’s character deficiencies will be 
reformed.”68 Because juveniles have the capacity to change,69 juvenile of-
fenders have more potential to be rehabilitated,70 a factor courts consider in 
juvenile punishment. 
Retribution differs from the previous goals of punishment because in-
stead of simply trying to prevent crime, the purpose of retribution is to elicit 
repayment or enact revenge upon the offender.71 Retribution also focuses on 
the offender’s culpable state of mind.72 As recognized by society and the 
Supreme Court, however, juveniles generally have a less culpable state of 
mind, which means that the justification for retribution is not as strong when 
dealing with children.73 
D. Objective Indicia of the National Consensus 
When distinguishing between appropriate sentences for children and 
adults, in some cases, the Court considers whether there is a national con-
sensus for or against a certain punishment.74 In Thompson, the Court recog-
nized that all states had enacted legislation differentiating between criminal 
defendants sixteen and older and those younger than sixteen,75 which justi-
fied the Court’s decision to ban the death penalty for individuals under the 
 
 65. Cotton, supra note 58, at 1316. Statistics show that sixty-seven percent of adult 
offenders released from state prison will become repeat offenders within three years. Gra-
ham, 560 U.S. at 72 (citing Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 26 (2003)). 
 66. Graham, 560 U.S. at 68 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 573). 
 67. Cotton, supra note 58, at 1316–17. 
 68. Graham, 560 U.S. at 68 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570). 
 69. Roper, 543 U.S. at 570. 
 70. Graham, 560 U.S. at 74 (discussing the briefs of the amici curiae, which explain that 
juvenile offenders are more receptive to rehabilitation). 
 71. Retribution, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 1511 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 10th ed., 2014). 
 72. Ryan, supra note 61, at 102–03. 
 73. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988). 
 74. Ryan, supra note 61, at 87. 
 75. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 823–24. At that time, eighteen states had completely abol-
ished the death penalty for individuals under sixteen. Id. at 829. 
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age of sixteen.76 In Roper, the Supreme Court followed similar reasoning in 
determining that eighteen was the more appropriate dividing line for capital 
punishment.77 
As part of this analysis, a court may also take into account outside 
sources, such as how frequently the judgment is imposed as well as public 
or professional opinion.78 In Graham, the Court looked at actual sentencing 
practices, not just statutory schemes.79 Just under 125 juvenile offenders 
nationwide were actually serving sentences of life without parole for non-
homicide crimes in 2010.80 Because the sentence had actually been applied 
relatively few times, the Court concluded that the nation was generally 
against it.81 
The Supreme Court also acknowledged that medical research indicates 
children’s brains are fundamentally different from adults’ brains.82 Science 
shows that only a small portion of children who participate in illegal activi-
ties will continue that pattern into their adult lives.83 Based on society’s 
views and the views of the scientific community, the Court established that 
scientific and professional opinion support the Court’s conclusion that chil-
dren are different from adults and those differences need to be taken into 
account during sentencing.84 
E. Applying the Precedents in Miller 
“An offender’s age is relevant to the Eighth Amendment, and criminal 
procedure laws that fail to take defendants’ youthfulness into account at all 
would be flawed.”85 In deciding Miller, the majority opinion of the Supreme 
Court relied heavily on the analysis of its previous decisions in Graham and 
Roper.86 The Court recapped the fundamental differences between children 
and adults, and the scientific evidence that supports this distinction.87 The 
 
 76. Id. at 838. 
 77. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005). 
 78. Ryan, supra note 61, at 87. 
 79. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 62 (2010). 
 80. Id. at 64. 
 81. See id. at 67 (explaining that the practice of sentencing juveniles to life without 
parole for a non-homicide crime was “exceedingly rare”). 
 82. Id. at 68. 
 83. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 
U.S. 551, 570 (2005)). 
 84. Id. at 2469. 
 85. Graham, 540 U.S. at 76. 
 86. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464–69. 
 87. Id. at 2464–65. 
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Court also discussed the penological justifications in relation to a mandatory 
sentence of life without parole.88 
In each of these cases, the Court consistently pointed out that juvenile 
offenders are inherently less culpable than their adult counterparts, and 
therefore, are entitled to more particularized attention when it comes to sen-
tencing.89 It follows that the same mitigating qualities in which the Court 
relies on to invalidate the mandatory aspect of sentencing a juvenile to life 
without parole are applicable to any mandatory sentence imposed upon a 
juvenile offender. Further, mitigating qualities are also relevant to cases in 
which juveniles were sentenced with mandatory life without parole prior to 
this decision. 
III.   ARGUMENT 
The Supreme Court of the United States limited its holding in Miller v. 
Alabama to mandatory sentences of life without parole.90 This limitation 
fails to acknowledge that the analysis supporting the holding may equally 
apply to juveniles subjected to any mandatory sentence.91 The opinion also 
leaves open the question of retroactive application of the holding.92 The fol-
lowing sections discuss these two issues and argue that the next steps are 
(A) prohibition of all mandatory sentences for juvenile offenders, and (B) 
retroactive application of Miller. 
A. Mandatory Minimum Sentencing of Juvenile Offenders is Inconsistent 
with the Supreme Court’s Approach in Miller 
Mandatory minimum sentencing schemes are an unnecessary evil in 
our criminal system,93 particularly when applied to juvenile offenders. This 
form of sentencing reemerged in our jurisprudence at a time when the 
American public was under the impression that crime rates were rising and 
 
 88. Id. at 2465. 
 89. See generally Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464–69. 
 90. Id. at 2469. 
 91. Id. at 2482 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting). 
 92. See People v. Morfin, 981 N.E.2d 1010, 1024 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2012) (Sterba 
J., concurring) (recognizing that the Court did not announce whether the rule applied retroac-
tively as required by Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 300 (1989)). 
 93. See Michael Tonry, The Mostly Unintended Effects of Mandatory Penalties: Two 
Centuries of Consistent Findings, 38 CRIME & JUST. 65, 103 (2009) (arguing that a presump-
tive penalty, as opposed to a mandatory penalty, would actually achieve the goals of manda-
tory sentences without the negative side effects). 
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lawmakers wanted to appear “tough on crime.”94 Mandatory sentences have 
been established for various crimes, ranging from drug offenses to economic 
crimes to more serious offenses, such as homicide.95 
Because many jurisdictions transfer juvenile offenders to the adult 
court system, juveniles are also subject to the same adult sentences.96 The 
nature of mandatory minimums, however, completely undermines the Su-
preme Court’s “children are different” approach to sentencing.97 This section 
argues that the Supreme Court’s holding in Miller and the other Eighth 
Amendment cases, although currently limited to the harshest punishments in 
our society,98 should be extended to outlaw mandatory minimum sentences 
for juveniles across the board. 
The following section briefly explains the history of mandatory mini-
mums before turning to an analysis of why this form of sentencing simply 
does not work, even in the context of adults. The final section explains why 
the Supreme Court’s approach to sentencing juveniles leads to the conclu-
sion that these sentences impose an unconstitutionally “cruel and unusual 
punishment”99 on juvenile offenders. 
1. A Brief History of Mandatory Minimum Sentences 
Mandatory sentences have been a part of the American criminal justice 
system since the late 1700s, when capital punishment was mandated for 
serious offenses such as murder or treason.100 In the second half of the twen-
tieth century, Congress began to change its perception of mandatory mini-
mum penalties by enacting them more frequently, applying them to more 
crimes, and lengthening the mandatory sentences.101 Public support for man-
 
 94. Karen Lutjen, Note, Culpability and Sentencing Under Mandatory Minimums and 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The Punishment No Longer Fits the Criminal, 10 NOTRE 
DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 389, 394 (1996). 
 95. For a full list see Charles Doyle, Federal Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Statutes, 
CONG. RES. SERV. 101–16 (Sept. 9, 2013), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32
040.pdf. 
 96. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 139 (2005) (explaining that 
although every American jurisdiction has a separate court in which to try juvenile offenders, 
every jurisdiction has also created exceptions allowing for transfer to adult court under speci-
fied circumstances). 
 97. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467. 
 98. Id. at 2475 (“[A] judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating 
circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles.”). 
 99. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 100. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, Report to the Congress: Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the 
Federal Criminal Justice System 7 (Oct. 2011), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative
_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/Mandatory_Minimum_Penaltie
s/20111031_RtC_PDF/Chapter_02.pdf. 
 101. Id. at 22. 
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datory sentences saw another resurgence in the 1980s, particularly for drug 
related offenses.102 
These ebbs and flows resulted from a misguided public belief that 
overall crime rates were increasing, including crimes committed by juve-
niles.103 This perception was largely due to media influence.104 In-depth cov-
erage and media attention given to violent crimes, such as the Columbine 
shooting, left the public believing that heinous acts like these were a symbol 
of continuing youth violence.105 
In addition, there was also a “widespread perception that young people 
[would] not behave unless the punishment for wrongdoing [was] severe.”106 
Therefore, juveniles were transferred to adult court where they were subject 
to the same mandatory minimums applied to adult offenders,107 without any 
consideration of their age, background, or other mitigating factors. Instead 
of giving the child a reason not to commit a crime, the child was treated the 
same as an, arguably, more culpable adult offender.108 
2. Mandatory Minimums Do Not Satisfy Their Intended Goals 
When mandatory minimums were enacted, proponents thought that 
they would assure evenhandedness, transparency, and crime prevention.109 
This did not turn out to be the case; in fact, in most instances, the opposite 
occurred.110 Overall, “[m]andatory penalties are a bad idea.”111 They do not 
aid society in accomplishing its penological goal of deterrence112 and have 
actually increased the prison population.113 
A convicted criminal may face a harsh mandatory penalty based on one 
aggravating circumstance.114 Because of the statutory nature of mandatory 
 
 102. Id. at 23. 
 103. JULIAN V. ROBERTS ET AL., PENAL POPULISM AND PUBLIC OPINION: LESSONS FROM 
FIVE COUNTRIES 107 (2003). 
 104. Id. at 111. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 109. 
 107. ZIMRING, supra note 96, at 139. 
 108. See ROBERTS ET AL., supra note 103, at 109 (explaining that giving a child a reason 
not to commit a crime is more effective than giving the child a more severe punishment). 
 109. Tonry, supra note 93, at 67. 
 110. See id. at 67–68 (explaining that in practice judges and prosecutors sometimes cir-
cumvent mandatory penalties, which ultimately leads to unjust results). 
 111. Id. at 100. 
 112. Id. at 68. 
 113. LOIS G. FORER, A RAGE TO PUNISH: THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF 
MANDATORY SENTENCING 151 (1994). 
 114. See Gary T. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the Effectiveness 
of Determinate Sentencing Reform, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 61, 66 (1993) (arguing that both deter-
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minimums, sometimes only one or two factors will be taken into account 
during sentencing.115 For example, some crimes can have a “tariff-like” ef-
fect in which anyone who commits a particular crime will receive a particu-
lar sentence without any consideration of that person’s level of culpability or 
any other mitigating factor.116 One former Philadelphia judge felt that “trial 
judges are far better situated than any other professionals to see the often 
tragic consequences of the decisions the law impels.”117 
Nevertheless, proponents urged that this type of punishment would de-
ter both future and repeat offenders.118 Mandatory sentences, however, have 
not been proven to have a deterrent effect, except in minor crimes like 
speeding.119 Further, it is unlikely an immature juvenile offender, with gen-
erally less culpability, will be deterred by a mandatory sentence any more 
than a discretionary sentence for any particular crime.120 
Not only has mandatory sentencing failed to deter criminals, but it has 
also actually led to an increase in the prison population.121 The United States 
prison population is increasing at one of the highest rates in the world.122 
From 1970 to present, the prison population in the United States increased 
from only about 200,000 prisoners to about 1.4 million prisoners.123 The 
most common mandatory minimum sentence is five years for a non-violent 
crime.124 The financial costs to society are significant,125 but the social costs 
are even greater, because the inmate is released and still unable to function 
in society, absent some form of rehabilitation.126 
 
minate and mandatory sentencing schemes lead to just as much disparity in sentencing as 
indeterminate schemes). 
 115. Lutjen, supra note 94, at 402. 
 116. Id. at 401. 
 117. FORER, supra note 113, at 14. Judge Forer left the bench after being forced to im-
plement a mandatory five-year sentence on an offender who had repaid the $50.00 he had 
stolen while holding up a taxi with a toy pistol and had rehabilitated himself in the five years 
following his conviction. Id. at 2–4. 
 118. See Lutjen, supra note 94, at 395 (explaining that both special and general deter-
rence were purposes promoted for mandatory minimums). 
 119. Tonry, supra note 93, at 68. 
 120. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 72 (2010) (finding that juveniles are generally 
less susceptible to deterrence). 
 121. See FORER, supra note 113, at 151 (describing how mandatory sentencing causes 
prison overcrowding). 
 122. Id. at 1. 
 123. The Editorial Board, Why Prisons Are Shrinking, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/28/opinion/why-prisons-are-shrinking.html?r=0. 
 124. FORER, supra note 113, at 153. 
 125. Id. (explaining that about twenty years ago it would have costed society about 
$175,000 to incarcerate one inmate for five years). 
 126. Id. 
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3. Mandatory Minimums and Miller 
The analysis used to reverse the mandatory sentence in Miller, and the 
other cases described above, is applicable to all mandatory sentences for 
juveniles.127 In Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Court recognized that the 
analysis used to strike down sentences of life without parole for non-
homicide offenders was not limited to just those crimes, or even “crime-
specific.”128 The Court then applied that same analysis, from Roper and 
Graham, to strike down mandatory life without parole in Miller.129 
Justice Roberts noted in his dissent that “[t]here is no clear reason that 
principle [behind today’s decision] would not bar all mandatory sentences 
for juveniles, or any juvenile sentence as harsh as what a similarly situated 
adult would receive.”130 The majority in Miller also recognized that an ap-
propriate sentence for an adult might not be appropriate for a child.131 
Although the opinions provided by the Court in Roper, Graham, and 
Miller have considered harsh punishments such as the death penalty and life 
without parole, the underlying principle of these decisions points to the fact 
that children need individualized sentencing.132 “Such mandatory penalties, 
by their nature, preclude a sentencer from taking account of an offender’s 
age and the wealth of characteristics and circumstances attendant to it.”133 
Holding a juvenile to the same standard of an adult directly contradicts the 
analysis supporting these decisions, because it ignores the entire premise 
upon which the holding is based—kids are inherently different from 
adults.134 
 
 127. See Craig S. Lerner, Sentenced to Confusion: Miller v. Alabama and the Coming 
Wave of Eighth Amendment Cases, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 25, 31 (2012) (“And if the ma-
jority dares to follow its reasoning in Miller—that is, the need to take into account a juve-
nile’s peculiar characteristics before imposing punishment—to its logical culmination, all 
mandatory sentences for juveniles will be prohibited.”). 
 128. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012) (relying on Graham v. Florida, 560 
U.S. 48, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010)) (“But none of what [Graham] said about children—about 
their distinctive (and transitory) mental traits and environmental vulnerabilities—is crime-
specific.”). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 2482 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting). 
 131. Id. at 2470 (majority opinion). 
 132. See id. at 2468. 
 133. Id. at 2467. 
 134. AARON KUPCHIK, JUDGING JUVENILES: PROSECUTING ADOLESCENTS IN ADULT AND 
JUVENILE COURTS 19 (2006). 
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B. Not Applying Miller Retroactively Perpetuates the Cruelty Miller Was 
Meant to Prohibit 
The second major issue with the decision in Miller v. Alabama is that it 
fails to specifically state that the decision applies retroactively, leading to a 
split of authority among courts. Some jurisdictions have held that under 
Teague v. Lane,135 Miller presents a new rule and, thus, applies retroactive-
ly.136 But in other jurisdictions,137 the approximately 2,000 prisoners current-
ly serving mandatory sentences of life without parole for crimes committed 
as a juvenile138 are not entitled to collateral review of their sentences. The 
following section explains the Teague standard and then examines both 
sides of the jurisdictional split. Finally, it concludes with an argument as to 
why retroactive application of the Miller decision is the more favorable ap-
proach. 
1. The Teague Standard 
Every Supreme Court decision has lasting consequences not only for 
the parties involved, but also for Americans who may face the same or simi-
lar issues in the future. In the early 1900s, all new Supreme Court decisions 
were retroactively applied to civil cases that were still directly appealable 
and any criminal case under a writ of habeas corpus.139 In 1965, the Supreme 
Court restricted the broad retroactive application of its decisions.140 This 
change ultimately led to the rule described in Teague v. Lane, which is still 
applied today.141 
 
 135. 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
 136. See, e.g., People v. Morfin, 981 N.E.2d 1010, 1022 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). 
 137. See, e.g., In re Morgan, 713 F.3d 1365, 1367 (11th Cir. 2013); Johnson v. Ponton, 
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149021, at *20 (E.D. Va. Oct. 16, 2013); Martin v. Symmes, 2013 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147965, at *51 (D. Minn. Oct. 15, 2013); Falcon v. State, 111 So.3d 973, 
973 (Fla. Ct. App. 2013). 
 138. See Susan Haigh, States Revisit Mandatory Sentences for Juveniles, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Aug. 18, 2013, 1:13PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/states-revisit-mandatory-
sentences-juveniles (describing the story of Nicholas Aponte who was sentenced to thirty 
eight years without parole in 1995 after being convicted of a felony murder committed at the 
age of seventeen). 
 139. 1 LAFAVE, ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 2.11(a) (3d ed. 2013) (discussing the 
evolution of retroactive application). 
 140. Id. (explaining that Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), changed the way 
courts viewed retroactive application in future cases). Because the Court was able to hold that 
some rules did not have to be applied retroactively, it was able to make significant changes to 
criminal procedure without concern for the costs or other administrative problems that result-
ed from the original rule. Id. 
 141. Id. 
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Generally, if a Supreme Court decision implements a new constitution-
al rule, it is only applicable to the present case and cases that are still being 
considered on direct review.142 Under Teague, however, there are two excep-
tions.143 The first exception applies to new rules that change the status of 
previously illegal conduct by making it legal or prevent a category of pun-
ishments for a certain group of defendants based on status or the offense 
committed.144 The second exception applies to “watershed rules of criminal 
procedure.”145 This exception has been very narrowly construed, with only 
one case ever meeting its high standard.146 
The first exception, however, has been frequently applied in the Su-
preme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.147 Decisions that have 
been applied retroactively, such as Graham v. Florida and Roper v. Sim-
mons, typically involve substantive rather than procedural rules.148 The rule 
in Miller, although predicated on the Eighth Amendment like Graham and 
Roper, is arguably a procedural rule, because it prevents states from sentenc-
ing a juvenile to life without parole without consideration of mitigating cir-
cumstances, but it does not bar the sentence as a whole.149 It does, however, 
 
 142. Teague, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (“adopt[ing] Justice Harlan’s view of retroactivity 
for cases on collateral review.”). 
 143. Id. at 311–14 (discussing the two exceptions to the general rule of retroactivity sug-
gested by Justice Harlan). 
 144. See Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 416 (2004) (describing the two exceptions set out 
in Teague and recognizing the limited application of the second exception). 
 145. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311. 
Typically, it should be the case that any conviction free from federal constitu-
tional error at the time it became final, will be found, upon reflection, to have 
been fundamentally fair and conducted under those procedures essential to the 
substance of a full hearing. However, in some situations it might be that time and 
growth in social capacity, as well as judicial perceptions of what we can rightly 
demand of the adjudicatory process, will properly alter our understanding of the 
bedrock procedural elements that must be found to vitiate the fairness of a par-
ticular conviction. 
Id. (quoting Justice Harlan in Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693–694 (1971) (Har-
lan, J., concurring)). 
 146. See State v. Tate, 130 So.3d 829, 839–40 (La. 2013) (describing the only case to 
which the second Teague exception was ever applied, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 
(1963), in which the Supreme Court held that indigent offenders charged with felonies must 
have the opportunity to be represented by counsel). 
 147. See 7 LAFAVE, ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 28.6(e) (3d ed. 2012) (explaining that 
the rules in Graham v. Florida and Roper v. Simmons were applied retroactively under the 
first exception). 
 148. Id. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), banned life without parole for juveniles 
convicted of non-homicide crimes, and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), outlawed 
capital punishment for offenders under the age of eighteen. 
 149. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2471 (2012); see 7 LAFAVE, ET AL., CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE § 28.6(e) (describing the difference between Miller and the other cases which are 
retroactively applied). 
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prevent a certain group of defendants—juveniles—from receiving a catego-
ry of sentences, which is also arguably substantive.150 Nevertheless, the de-
cision has received varying treatment by the lower courts as explained be-
low. 
2. Jurisdictions in Favor of Retroactive Application 
Only a few jurisdictions have held that Miller v. Alabama applies retro-
actively despite significant public support for retroactive application.151 As 
one commentator asserts, “[t]he Constitution was meant to provide justice 
for all—not justice according to the date of application.”152 In at least four 
states, courts have held that Miller applies retroactively.153 
The Appellate Court of Illinois used the Teague analysis to conclude 
that Miller applies retroactively because it fits within the first exception 
where “a defendant faces a punishment that the law cannot impose upon 
him.” 154 According to that court, Miller created a new substantive rule be-
cause it required a broader sentencing range.155 In addition, what may be one 
of the strongest arguments for retroactive application, the appellate court 
pointed out that one of the Miller defendants, Kuntrell Jackson, was before 
the court on collateral review and was able to take advantage of the rule.156 
Several other jurisdictions have also concluded that Miller should ap-
ply retroactively. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Michigan applied Miller retroactively as a new substantive rule.157 The Su-
preme Court of Iowa also used the Teague analysis to justify applying Mil-
 
 150. See People v. Morfin, 981 N.E.2d 1010, 1022 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (applying Miller 
retroactively on similar grounds). 
 151. See, e.g., id.; Hill v. Snyder, 2013 U.S. Dist LEXIS 12160, *5-6 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 30, 
2013).  
 152. Redefining Justice One Year After Miller v. Alabama, JUVENILE LAW CENTER (June 
27, 2013) http://www.jlc.org/blog/redefining-justice-one-year-after-miller-v-alabama. 
 153. Maggie Clark, After Supreme Court Ruling, States Act on Juvenile Sentences, THE 
PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Aug. 26, 2013), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-
analysis/blogs/stateline/2013/08/26/after-supreme-court-ruling-states-act-on-juvenile-sentenc
es. Iowa, Illinois, Mississippi, and the federal district court in Michigan have applied the 
ruling retroactively. Id. 
 154. People v. Morfin, 981 N.E.2d 1010, 1020 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (quoting Schriro v. 
Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004)); see also People v. Johnson, 998 N.E.2d 185 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2013). 
 155. Morfin, 981 N.E.2d at 1022. 
 156. Id. at 1022–23. 
 157. Hill v. Snyder, 2013 U.S. Dist LEXIS 12160, *5-6 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 30, 2013). Alt-
hough the court was considering a case on direct review, and thus, did not need to reach the 
issue of collateral review, it noted that it would apply Miller retroactively as a new substan-
tive law. Id. at *5–6 n.2. 
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ler retroactively.158 The Iowa court explained that although the ruling in Mil-
ler does create a new procedure by requiring a hearing, it “is the result of a 
substantive change in the law.”159 The Supreme Court of Mississippi also 
found the ruling was retroactive on collateral review in Jones v. State,160 
because the decision modified its substantive law.161 
In In re Pendleton,162 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit also 
found that the petitioners seeking to file habeas corpus petitions were eligi-
ble to do so under the new Miller rule.163 The court accepted the petitioner’s 
prima facie case that the rule could apply retroactively on three possible 
grounds.164 First, the Supreme Court had already applied the rule retroactive-
ly to Kuntrell Jackson, who was before the Supreme Court on collateral re-
view.165 Second, the rule falls under the first Teague exception as a new sub-
stantive rule. Third, the rule is a watershed procedural rule under the second 
Teague exception.166 
Most of the jurisdictions applying Miller retroactively recognize that 
although the decision has a procedural effect, it mandates a substantive 
change in the law for a particular group of defendants, which satisfies the 
first of the Teague exceptions.167 In addition, the authorities relied upon in 
Miller were applied retroactively, which indicates that Miller would logical-
ly apply retroactively as well.168 Finally, many of the courts supporting ret-
roactive application point out that the Supreme Court has already applied the 
ruling retroactively in the case of Kuntrell Jackson.169 Each of these jurisdic-
tions provides substantial support for applying Miller retroactively, yet sev-
eral jurisdictions have declined to do so, creating a split. 
3. Jurisdictions Opposed to Retroactive Application 
In Louisiana, 225 offenders, who were sentenced to life without parole 
as juveniles, will not have the same opportunity afforded to Kuntrell Jack-
 
 158. State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 115–16 (Ia. 2013). 
 159. Id. (finding that the rule prevents a state from imposing a certain punishment on 
certain people under the first Teague exception). 
 160. 122 So.3d 698 (Miss. 2013). 
 161. Jones v. State, 122 So.3d 698, 702 (Miss. 2013). 
 162. 732 F.3d 280 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 163. In re Pendleton, 732 F.3d 280, 282 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. See, e.g., State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 115 (Ia. 2013). 
 168. See id. at 116 (“If a substantial portion of the authority used in Miller has been ap-
plied retroactively, Miller should logically receive the same treatment.”). 
 169. See, e.g., id.; People v. Morfin, 981 N.E.2d 1010, 1023 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). 
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son to present evidence of their mitigating circumstances.170 The Supreme 
Court of Louisiana held that Miller is not subject to retroactive application 
on collateral review.171 Following the Teague analysis, the Supreme Court of 
Louisiana concluded that Miller, as a procedural rule, did not fit under either 
exception.172 Because Miller only affects the “permissible methods” through 
which a state may punish a juvenile offender, it did not satisfy the first ex-
ception.173 Miller also failed to meet the high threshold of the second excep-
tion, according to the Supreme Court of Louisiana.174 
Several other jurisdictions have followed this line of reasoning.175 Mul-
tiple opinions from Florida state courts indicate that the rule will not apply 
retroactively in that jurisdiction.176 The Eleventh Circuit also found that Mil-
ler was only a procedural rule and, therefore, not retroactive on collateral 
review.177 Both the Supreme Court of Minnesota and United States District 
Court for the District of Minnesota declined to apply Miller retroactively, 
following the Teague analysis for the same reasons cited above.178 The Unit-
ed States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia also determined 
the rule was procedural.179 The Virginia court noted that the Supreme Court 
of the United States specifically distinguished Miller from Graham because 
Graham instituted a categorical bar whereas Miller affected the sentencing 
process.180 
 
 170. Paula Purpura, Louisiana Supreme Court Hears Argument on Parole for Juvenile 
Killers, NOLA.com, (Sept. 4, 2013, 6:20 PM) http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2013/09/
louisiana_supreme_court_hears.html. 
 171. State v. Tate, 130 So.3d 829, 844 (La. 2013). 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 838. 
 174. Id. at 839–41. 
 175. See, e.g., In re Morgan, 713 F.3d 1365, 1367 (11th Cir. 2013); Martin v. Symmes, 
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147965, at *51 (D. Minn. Oct. 15, 2013); Johnson v. Ponton, 2013 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149021, at *16 (E.D. Va. Oct. 16, 2013); Falcon v. State, 111 So. 3d 973, 
973 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
 176. See generally Falcon, 111 So. 3d at 973; Johnson v. State, 2013 Fla. App. LEXIS 
6821, at *2 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2013); Geter v. State, 115 So. 3d 375, 385 (Fla. 
3d Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
 177. Morgan, 713 F.3d at 1368. The Eleventh Circuit relies on authority that indicates 
that a rule becomes retroactive only when the Supreme Court so holds, but the court fails to 
address the fact that Kuntrell Jackson’s case was brought on collateral review. Id. at 1367–68. 
 178. Martin, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147965 at *50-51; Chambers v. Minnesota, 831 
N.W.2d 311, 331 (Minn. 2013). 
 179. Ponton, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149021 at *16. 
 180. Id. at *17. Notably, the court recognizes that just because the Supreme Court applied 
the rule to Jackson’s case that it will not be applied retroactively in all cases. Id. at *13–14 
(citing Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374–75 (2010), in which the Court created a new 
rule, which was brought on collateral review, but later announced in a separate opinion that it 
would not be applied retroactively). 
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These cases generally rely on the same proposition: Miller is limited to 
a procedural rule of law and does not fit into either of the Teague excep-
tions.181 Based on the analysis behind Miller, Graham, and Roper—that kids 
are different from adults when it comes to sentencing182—it seems unjust to 
deny those defendants whose sentences became final before Miller the op-
portunity afforded to Kuntrell Jackson.183 In the interest of justice, the deci-
sion made by those jurisdictions in which Miller has been retroactively ap-
plied should become the prevailing view.184 
4. Miller Merits Retroactive Application 
Indeed, if ever there was a legal rule that should—as a matter of law and 
morality—be given retroactive effect, it is the rule announced in Miller. 
To hold otherwise would allow the state to impose unconstitutional pun-
ishment on some persons but not others, an intolerable miscarriage of 
justice.185 
If the premise behind differentiated sentencing standards between ju-
venile offenders and adults is predicated on the notion that “children are 
constitutionally different,”186 then, in the interest of justice, Miller v. Ala-
bama warrants retroactive application. 
Sentenced to mandatory life without parole, a juvenile offender never 
has a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated ma-
turity and rehabilitation.”187 Consider the case of Sharon Wiggins.188 Sharon 
was seventeen when she was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced 
to mandatory life without parole in Pennsylvania.189 Although Sharon’s 
crime was terrible, as a child she was a victim of poverty, neglect, and 
abuse, 190 factors the court was not permitted to consider because her sen-
 
 181. See, e.g., id. at *20 (refusing to apply Miller retroactively). 
 182. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012) (explaining that as established 
in Graham and Roper “children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of 
sentencing”). 
 183. People v. Morfin, 981 N.E.2d 1010, 1025 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2012) (Sterba J., 
concurring). The Teague Court specifically noted that justice required retroactive application 
of a rule once applied to the defendant in the case. Id. at 1024 (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 
U.S. 288, 300 (1989)). Therefore, because the rule was applied to Jackson on collateral re-
view, it follows that it is applicable to all similarly situated defendants. Id. at 1025. 
 184. See supra text accompanying note 183. 
 185. Hill v. Synder, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12160, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 30, 2013). 
 186. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464. 
 187. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010). 
 188. In Memory of Sharon Wiggins, a Child 45 Years Ago Sentenced to Die in Prison, 
JUVENILE LAW CENTER (Mar. 25, 2013) http://www.jlc.org/blog/memory-sharon-wiggins-
child-45-years-ago-sentenced-die-prison. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
2015] SENTENCING JUVENILES 331 
tence was mandatory.191 Although Sharon committed a horrible crime as a 
minor, Sharon was generally reformed during her time behind bars; she ob-
tained a bachelor’s degree, over 10,000 educational certificates, and tutored 
other inmates so that they were able to obtain their GEDs.192 Unfortunately, 
Sharon was never given the chance to prove that she had become a better 
person because she passed away in prison at the age of sixty-two.193 
In jurisdictions where Miller is not retroactively applied, people like 
Sharon, who have actually been reformed, will never be given the chance to 
prove that they, too, have changed.194 If the mitigating circumstances of 
youth that support the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller are so important 
for juvenile offenders today,195 then they should not be any less important 
for juveniles that committed crimes before the decision was made. 
The Supreme Court’s analysis in Miller, Graham, Roper, and Thomp-
son hinges on the fundamental differences between children and adults. The 
Supreme Court explained in Miller that its decision was based in part “on 
common sense—on ‘what any parent knows’” about a child’s lack of ma-
turity and development.196 Common sense indicates that if it is “cruel and 
unusual”197 to sentence a juvenile to mandatory life without parole now, it 
was cruel and unusual even before these cases came up for review. 
Although the Supreme Court arguably made only a procedural change 
to criminal sentencing through its decision, Miller also banned a particular 
sentence for a group of individuals, which satisfies the first Teague excep-
tion and merits retroactive application.198 Without retroactive application 
across the board, juveniles in states like Louisiana will continue to serve an 
unconstitutional sentence.199 In addition to the reasons cited by the courts 
above,200 the approach the Supreme Court has taken of distinguishing chil-
dren from adults in terms of sentencing supports giving these offenders an 
opportunity for collateral review. 
 
 191. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467 (explaining that mandatory sentences inherently pre-
vent mitigating factors from being taken into account). 
 192. See Wiggins, supra note 188. 
 193. Id. 
 194. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468 (explaining that mandatory sentences preclude the 
possibility of rehabilitation). 
 195. Id. at 2464 n.5 (explaining that the research relied upon in Graham and Roper, to 
show that children are developmentally different from adults, has gotten even stronger with 
time). 
 196. Id. at 2464. 
 197. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 198. See People v. Morfin, 981 N.E.2d 1010, 1022 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2012). 
 199. See generally State v. Tate, 130 So. 3d 829, 844 (La. 2013) (holding that Miller does 
not apply retroactively). 
 200. See infra Part III.B.2. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s approach to individualized sentencing of juvenile 
offenders has been based on the notion that children are fundamentally dif-
ferent from adults when it comes to the level of culpability for a crime.201 
Although the Court has limited its decisions to those cases where a juvenile 
is sentenced with society’s most severe punishments,202 its analysis supports 
the conclusion that when sentencing juveniles, mitigating factors, which 
make children constitutionally different from adults, should always be con-
sidered. 
If the Supreme Court is going to continue with its “children are differ-
ent” approach to juvenile justice, it needs to expand the holding of Miller v. 
Alabama to recognize that children are different across the board. The next 
steps are to prohibit all mandatory sentences of juvenile offenders and apply 
the rule in Miller retroactively, so that the thousands of juvenile offenders 
now serving an unconstitutional sentence will be able to make their case. 
Those steps will ensure that justice is served and a child’s mitigating cir-
cumstances are taken into account, leading to a stronger society as a whole. 
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